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Introduction
Decision-making is fundamental to 
the provision of effective medical care. 
Early in training, health care practi-
tioners (HCPs) are taught a linear, 
analytical approach to decision-mak-
ing that works well for the majority of 
stable patients. This follows an ordered 
structure: obtaining a patient’s histo-
ry, performing a physical examination, 
developing a differential diagnosis, or-
dering investigations and, finally, in-
stituting therapy. For stable patients, 
this approach maximizes information- 
gathering and provides time for con-
templation. In contrast, during medical 
crises this strategy is impractical and 
potentially dangerous. This is especially 
true if we postpone urgent resuscitation. 
Accordingly, the provision of emergency 
care can be challenging for HCPs and 
perilous for patients. 
The goal of this chapter is to allow 
HCPs to better understand their own 
decision-making habits and how those 
habits impact crisis resource man-
agement (CRM) in everyday clinical 
practice. Moreover, in understanding 
our own decision-making processes we 
as HCPs may become better able to pass 
on successful techniques to the next 
generation of decision-makers.
During a medical crisis, the goal is 
to maximize patient stability and min-
imize delays. Diagnosis and therapy 
should occur concurrently, often at the 
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“All Life is  
Problem Solving.”
Sir Karl Popper
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expense of diagnostic precision. Data-gathering focuses more on what is immediately 
available (i.e., vital signs and point-of-care analysis) and less on waiting for diagnostic 
tests (computed tomography [CT] scans, laboratory results). Similarly, consultations 
are limited to specific interventions (e.g., intubation, surgery, help with resuscitation) 
rather than diagnostic opinions. To manage the patient in peril, the team needs to rap-
idly convert available data (e.g., an increasing heart rate) into usable information (e.g., 
the patient’s condition is worsening) and follow with a logical, expedited response (e.g., 
bolus fluids). The art of acute care medicine is ensuring that while we do not intervene 
without sufficient thought, we do not allow uncertainty to cause potentially harmful 
delays. 
As outlined, the concurrent approach used during crises downplays the need to 
establish an immediate etiologic diagnosis (e.g., streptococcal septicemia). Instead, we 
often redefine uncertainty by providing broader temporary physiologic or pathophys-
iologic diagnoses (e.g., hypotension or septic shock). Missing diagnostic details and 
treatment gaps are filled in later when the medical crisis has abated and when traditional 
sequential decision-making strategies can be safely used again. The concurrent approach 
increases the chance that the physician-leader and medical team can stay ahead of a 
rapidly evolving situation and can simultaneously manage competing priorities. 
Beyond the challenges of time-sensitive decision-making, the effective physi-
cian-leader must also maximize the effectiveness of the whole team, regardless of high 
stimulus density and high clinical stakes.1 This can be done by using well-established 
CRM principles. These CRM skills are reviewed elsewhere, but include leadership and 
followership, situational awareness, communication skills, resource utilization and 
teamwork. Specifically, in this chapter we focus on the theory and practice of effec-
tive decision-making as well as the effect that experience, cognitive load and working 
memory have on decision-making. 
The Fundamentals of Medical Decision-making
Although decision-making in one form or another is important for all HCPs, it is 
central to clinical doctors, who make the majority of high-stakes decisions. Despite its 
importance, decision-making is rarely deliberately addressed in traditional medical cur-
ricula. Instead, doctors typically gain most of their experience on the job during clinical 
work. With experience, most eventually become capable decision-makers; however, the 
process of decision-making — and deliberate strategies to optimize that process — 
are often not fully appreciated by the decision-makers themselves.2-4 In other words, 
clinicians often become unconsciously competent decision-makers. 
Over a career, medical decision-makers should commit to honing their intuition 
and clinical reflexes. However, it may be difficult for HCPs to articulate how or why 
they make particular decisions.2 For example, an experienced physician can quickly 
identify the deteriorating asthma patient, decide to intubate and begin appropriate 
therapy. When asked later what made them intervene so quickly, answers might include 
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“the patient was fatiguing,” or “if I hadn’t, then the patient was going to arrest.” Though 
true, these judgments are intuitive (or intrinsically tacit) and difficult to relate to for 
novices. This often makes decision-making difficult to teach.
Understanding decision-making during crises involves addressing the limits of 
human working memory. We can reliably manage only a finite number of discrete 
elements of information (approximately seven), and an even smaller number when 
information-processing is required.3,4 For example, for the novice who is managing 
a patient with congestive heart failure (CHF), these information elements may be as 
basic as “hypoxemia,” “hypertension,” “crackles,” “volume overload,” “diuretic” and 
“positive-pressure ventilation.” These six items approach the novice’s working memory 
capacity. In contrast, for the expert, multiple elements can be integrated into informa-
tion units or chunks  (e.g., “CHF presentation” and “CHF management”). This leaves 
a larger proportion of working memory available for other tasks. Figure 1 summarizes 
this important concept. 
Educating decision-makers in the art of subconsciously grouping symptoms may 
facilitate their ability to efficiently recognize the “sick” patient. Of note, the ability 
to simply recognize a sick patient is every bit as important as acquiring knowledge or 
mastering manual skills. Accordingly, this subconscious group of symptoms should be 














Figure 1: Working Memory Use in Novices and Experts when Encountering a Clinical 
Situation
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Models of Decision-making
Decision-making (also called problem-solving in some CRM models) is a complex 
topic. However, it has been summarized using theoretical models from several pro-
fessional domains. Two of these models, Gary Klein’s Recognition-primed Decision 
(RPD) Model5 and Daniel Kahneman’s Dual Process Model (DPM),6 provide a foun-
dational understanding of the cognitive processes used by experts. 
Recognition-primed Decision-making Model (RPD)
The RPD model3 helps explain how successful decision-making can occur in com-
plex, ever-changing, medical environments despite the constraints of human work-
ing memory. As outlined, most experienced doctors, when faced with a crisis, do not 
consciously compare a multitude of options prior to acting. They recognize a clinical 
situation as typical, which immediately brings to mind a set of expectations, suitable 
goals and typical courses of action. For example, an experienced physician managing 
an intubated trauma patient with hypotension and hypoxemia might expedite a lung 
ultrasound, be confident enough that the patient has a pneumothorax and rapidly de-
compress the chest. This occurs rapidly not because that physician possesses special 
knowledge, but rather because he/she is “attuned.” In other words, the physician accepts 
the possibility of tension pneumothorax in all patients with chest trauma and under-
stands the danger of undertreating (more so than over-treating) this diagnosis. The 
experienced clinician also pattern-recognizes the association between tension pneumo-
thorax, positive-pressure ventilation, hypoxemia and hypotension. 
Understanding how, why and what we decide helps to define what makes an effec-
tive acute care doctor. Accordingly, they can usually focus quickly on high-yield diag-
nostic clues (often called “hard signs” or “red flags”), rapidly confirm/refute suspicions, 
address key dangers, act expeditiously and avoid wasting cognitive resources on extra-
neous details.7 Moreover, they are able to recognize when their initial course of action is 
flawed and modify their response because they are cognitively dexterous and sufficiently 
confident. If the plan cannot be easily modified, then the next most plausible course of 
action is rapidly pursued. This process is then repeated until an acceptable way forward 
is found.8 This sequence of steps forms the basis for the RPD model. Once again, it is 
in contrast to the traditional analytical approach of linear information-gathering and 
exhaustive hypothesis generation. 
The recognition displayed by the expert physician is analogous to intuition and is 
central to RPD. A junior doctor may not immediately recognize the previously de-
scribed cluster of signs and symptoms as a tension pneumothorax. As a result, the nov-
ice’s decision-making is more analytical and, hence, time-consuming. Despite every 
good intention, patients can suffer the consequences of delayed decision-making in 
time-sensitive situations. 
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Dual-process Model (DPM)
An alternative to the RPD model is the DPM described by Daniel Kahneman. This 
model conceptualizes thinking and decision-making into System I and System II. Sys-
tem I is involved in intuitive judgments that are fast and automatic. These judgments 
are relatively effortless and lack a sense of voluntary control.9 For example, the experi-
enced clinician who enters a ward and declares within seconds that a patient is “sick” 
or “not sick” is using System I. These are familiar situations and therefore the physician 
recognizes a pattern. As such, adept decision-making requires a learner who commits to 
repeated and regular exposure. 
System II is slower and more logical. It is activated when a situation is unfamiliar 
and therefore deviates from a System I construct. System II replaces fast and relatively 
effortless intuition with concerted logical reasoning.9 For example, the patient with 
resistant hypotension eventually found to have adrenal insufficiency is likely to have 
induced a physician’s System II processing. The ability to step back from a crisis and use 
System II reasoning during the stress of resuscitation is another hallmark of the experi-
enced and effective HCP. Again, this requires regular and repeated exposure — but this 
behavior can be taught and encouraged. For example, when teaching novices how to 
make decisions, it is often stressed that it is a dynamic/empiric process: if intuition fails, 
go back to a more structured approach (e.g., if a patient deteriorates or fails to respond 
and the problem is not easily identified, go back to “ABC”).
Complementary models
The DPM is supported by psychological literature regarding cognitive errors and 
biases, whereas the RPD model is supported by expert intuition and decision-making 
theory. However, these approaches overlap and are better thought of as complementary 
rather than oppositional. For example, the intuition that informs the RPD model is 
similar to System I processing within the DPM. Recognition (i.e., intuition, or Sys-
tem I processing) is relatively accurate in experts’ hands, but potentially problematic 
for novices. The danger of inexperience in the novice or fatigue in the expert is that 
both could oversimplify (or morph) complex medical problems in order to fit a pattern 
learned from previous (different) encounters. This cognitive bias is referred to as the 
simplifying heuristic.7 
In Situ Decision-makingRecognition,  
Expertise and Cognitive Load
Recognition is key to clinical decision-making. What is less clear is how HCPs de-
velop expertise in recognition. Research suggests that the practice environment needs to 
provide sufficient valid cues as well as the opportunity to identify such cues.7 Accord-
ingly, chaos, distraction and unhelpful team-mates can affect the likelihood of timely 
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recognition. Also, as previously outlined, for HCPs to become skilled in resuscitation 
medicine and to make effective decisions during crises, they need to have sufficient 
exposure and experience. This can be gained through clinical encounters or well-crafted 
medical simulations. Alternatively, we need to accept that clinical competence might 
never be gained. Regardless, it is unfair and illogical to expect HCPs rarely exposed to 
crisis decision-making to perform at a high level when disaster finally strikes.
Experiments based around operating room emergencies and cases managed by an-
esthesiology residents suggest that physicians at the resident level exhibit one of four 
problem-solving approaches.10 Residents who are “stalled” find it difficult to generate 
diagnostic possibilities or coordinate their responses. Others are “fixated” and quickly 
generate a plausible but incorrect diagnosis and have trouble deviating despite alternate 
cues (so-called “premature closure”). “Diagnostic vagabonds” produce a large number 
of possibilities but fail to rule them in or out. The “adaptive” group is the most effective. 
These residents generate a number of plausible diagnoses, rule certain ones out and 
respond appropriately. 
As HCPs gain experience 
they should become more 
likely to recognize immediate 
threats and, therefore, more 
likely to rapidly intervene. 
They are also likely to become 
more comfortable thinking 
and reacting despite diagnostic 
uncertainty. In other words, 
how HCPs process clinical 
information and make deci-
sions should naturally mature 
over time. Moreover, the way 
in which a practitioner solves 
problems is a prime way by 
which we can determine 
whether they are “fit for task,” 
or in need of further interven-
tion.11
HCPs will mature (or fail 
to mature) at different rates. 
The beneficial effect of learn-
ing through experience is that 
it should decrease cognitive 
load and thereby free up both 
working memory and high-




















Figure 2: Decision-Making Model, Methods and  
Relationship to Expertise.
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inexperienced acute care HCPs facing challenging medical crises may be too cognitively 
overloaded to recognize or respond. This results in an inability to consider alternate ap-
proaches, clinical exceptions, rare diagnoses, or pre-emptive interventions. It also results 
in novices being unable to stop and think, unable to perform dexterous procedures and 
unable to leverage CRM skills, such as communication and leadership (Figure 2).  In 
short, critical decision-making is not innate and therefore should not be left to chance. 
Teaching Decision-making 
If we accept that experienced physicians, bolstered by regular clinical exposure, are 
effective crisis decision-makers, then it makes sense to teach the RPD model. Accord-
ingly, Cohen and Freeman12 have used this model to address critical thinking using 
clinical cases. In order for teaching to be realistic, clinical information should be pre-
sented in an unpredictable sequence (also known as random practice schedule). This 
method not only mirrors acute care, but also forces learners to critically compare and 
contrast new data with whatever came before.13 For novices, it might be necessary to 
simplify the cases and provide guidance (or cognitive nudges) that help them recognize 
what is most relevant and what is most distracting.14 
During instruction, learners should focus on four beneficial activities: creating a 
story (where all existing evidence is incorporated and explained, and where reasonable 
assumptions are made despite uncertainty); testing a story (where inconsistencies and 
uncertainties are identified and the story refined through deliberate testing); evaluating 
a story (where plausibility is questioned by playing the devil’s advocate); and quick 
testing (where the time available and the consequences of actions are predetermined, 
thereby encouraging more immediate action if delays are unacceptable).15
Effective instruction in critical decision-making requires a pre-brief to describe a 
cognitive-strategy that can steer the decision-making process. It also requires a skilled 
facilitator who can prompt the learner to self-reflect on his/her developing strategy, with 
the collegial goal that it be further refined. Prompts should help learners prevent mis-
takes, challenge their biases and ensure they remain open to other explanations. When 
learning situations are presented in an unpredictable sequence, the use of retrospective 
prompts (e.g., were there any similarities between the last two situations?) are more 
effective than proactive prompts (e.g., are there any similarities between the follow-
ing two situations?). The combination of random practice schedule and retrospective 
prompts increases the likelihood that skills are transferred from one situation to the 
next.15 In this way, education around decision-making can benefit both practitioners 
and patients.
Summary
For those responsible for treating acutely ill patients, effective decision-making is a 
complex, but essential skill. It can take a career to truly master expert decision-making 
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and should not be left to chance. Despite a substantial body of knowledge about deci-
sion-making in non-medical domains, it is rarely taught or coached in medical training 
programs. Fortunately, there is emerging evidence surrounding decision-making that 
can be readily adapted to acute care medicine.  
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This picture is for reflection. How is this healthcare work-
er feeling: energized or exhausted,terrified or excited? If this 
was you, would you know when and how to ask for help or 
relief? Would you be lost in this individual pursuit from ev-
erything else or open to engagingwith the team? Would 
you be able to lead, would you be prepared to follow?
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